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The structure of neuropsychoanalytic explanations
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ABSTRACT
The “mechanism approach” to scientific explanation is to explain a phenomenon by showing how
it is generated through the interactions among its constituents; that is, the explanation elucidates
the internal causal structures of what is to be explained. The paper argues that the mechanism
approach to explanation may function as a framework for constructing neuropsychoanalytic
explanations. One important virtue of the mechanism approach is that it helps us see how
different levels, such as the neuroscientific and psychoanalytic levels, are integrated with each
other. It is argued that the mechanism approach does not entail reductionism or do away with
meaning and understanding. Based on the preceding discussion, the paper touches briefly
upon some challenges facing neuropsychoanalysis, such as its supposed clinical irrelevance, the
relation between neuropsychoanalysis and psychology, and the future of psychoanalysis in view
of the continuously growing knowledge about mind–brain processes.
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Neuropsychoanalysis is an interdisciplinary field of
research that aims to apply neuroscientific findings to
psychoanalysis and vice versa. The bulk of this paper
deals with what kind of explanations neuropsychoanaly-
sis can offer. The word “explanation” is used in a wide
variety of ways in ordinary English – for example,
explaining the meaning of a word, explaining how to
bake a pie, explaining why one made a certain decision,
etc. However, this paper only discusses scientific expla-
nations; more specifically, neuropsychoanalytic expla-
nations. The philosophy of science offers different
theories of what characterize the different kinds of scien-
tific explanations, but there is agreement that it is a fun-
damental contrast between explanation and description.
For example, a detailed description of a person’s person-
ality is not the same as an explanation why the person
developed this particular personality. Scientific expla-
nations are supposed to answer such “why-questions.”
I will argue that neuropsychoanalysis is well suited to
develop mechanism-based explanations of psychoanaly-
tic phenomena. Put simply, the mechanism approach
to scientific explanation is to explain a phenomenon by
showing how it is generated through the interactions
among its constituents; that is, the explanation exhibits
the internal causal structures of what is to be explained
Thus, causation plays an essential part in all mechan-
ism-based explanations.1 First, I will give an outline of
the mechanism approach to explanation and show that
it may function as a framework for constructing neuro-
psychoanalytic explanations. One important virtue of
the mechanism approach is that it helps us see how
different levels, such as the neuroscientific and psycho-
logical levels, are integrated with each other. Second, I
will argue that the mechanism approach does not
entail reductionism or do away with meaning and under-
standing. Finally, based on the preceding discussion, I
will touch briefly upon some challenges facing neuropsy-
choanalysis, such as its supposed clinical irrelevance, the
relation between neuropsychoanalysis and psychology,
and the future of psychoanalysis in view of the continu-
ously growing knowledge about mind–brain processes.
What is neuropsychoanalysis?
A prima facie problematic aspect of neuropsychoanalysis
is that it is difficult to characterize or define psychoana-
lysis. There is a plethora of different psychoanalytic the-
ories, such as Freudian theory, ego psychology, object
relations theory, self-psychology, etc. These theories dis-
agree on many important issues, and in addition, a lot of
disagreement exists within each theoretical perspective.
However, neuropsychoanalysis is not a separate school
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or theoretical perspective. On the contrary, neuropsy-
choanalysis should be considered as a methodological
framework for testing psychoanalytic hypotheses and
for constructing explanations for phenomena of neurop-
sychoanalytic interest. According to Solms and Turnbull
(2011, p. 141): “Neuropsychoanalysis is not (in our
opinion) a ‘school’ of psychoanalysis, in the way that
we currently speak of Freudian, Kleinian, Intersubjective,
and Self Psychology schools. Neuropsychoanalysis, we
feel, is far better conceptualized as a link between all
of psychoanalysis and the neurosciences.” Thus, it
appears that the psychoanalytic hypotheses worth
testing and relating to neuroscience can be taken from
all the different psychoanalytic schools.
According to Solms and Turnbull (2002, p. 6, 298 &
302), the clinical method of psychoanalysis has taken
us about as far as it is going to, on its own, but it
has proved hopelessly inadequate for the purpose of
deciding between the competing psychoanalytic the-
ories. In addition, we must take into consideration
that the best-supported explanatory possibilities actu-
ally may not belong to any of the opposing psycho-
analytic camps but are to be found in neuroscience
and psychology. I agree with Solms and Turnbull
(2002) that it is of utmost importance for psychoanaly-
sis to take into consideration evidence outside the
clinical psychoanalytic setting and relate psychoanaly-
tic theories to theories and explanations in neuro-
science and psychology.
Psychoanalysis has always been rich with bold and
interesting hypotheses, but until recently it has not
been the subject of extensive empirical research.
However, in the past two decades a robust literature
has been emerging (see, for example, Shedler (2010)
and Gabbard (2014) for psychoanalytic research con-
cerning psychopathology and therapy). Psychoanalysis
has been rather isolated from other disciplines, such as
experimental psychology and neuroscience, and
researchers in these disciplines have been somewhat
hostile, or at least indifferent, towards psychoanalytic
perspectives. Neuropsychoanalysis attempts to give psy-
choanalysis an empirical foundation and bring it closer
to the other related scientific disciplines.
In my view, neuropsychoanalysis’most important goal
seems to be to update Freudian metapsychology,
informed by neuroscientific explanations. In Freudian psy-
choanalysis, metapsychology has an uncertain meaning,
but it comprises the most fundamental theoretical prin-
ciples on which psychoanalysis must be founded. Freu-
dian metapsychology is a framework for explaining
psychoanalytic phenomena and neuropsychoanalysis
attempts to establish an updated and empirically based
metapsychology founded on neuroscience.
The mechanism approach to explanation
One of the central aims of philosophy of science is to
offer a taxonomy of different kinds of explanation and
to determine the criteria for genuine and valid scientific
explanations. The philosopher of science Carl Hempel
(1905–1997) argued that all genuine scientific expla-
nations must refer to scientific laws (Hempel, 1965). In
the philosophy of science, Hempel’s covering law
model of explanation was once the dominating theory
about scientific explanation and many explanations in
physics seem to follow the structure of Hempel’s
model. Explanations in physics usually refer to laws of
nature: for example, Newton’s laws, the Schrödinger
equation, etc. However, there seem to be few such
explanatory laws in psychoanalysis, biology, psychology,
and the social sciences. Of course, correlations and gen-
eralizations exist in psychoanalysis, psychology, and
biology; but these correlations and generalizations
usually are not used for explanatory purposes, which
means they are not used as premises in covering law
explanations. On the contrary, we often find the corre-
lations and generalizations puzzling and want them
explained. This point can be illustrated with an
example from medicine. The following generalization
has been empirically confirmed and illustrates the
placebo-effect:
(G) If people are given sugar pills but believe they are
taking painkillers, then they will report reduced pain.
Anne took some sugar pills that she believed were
painkillers, which explains why she reported less pain.
The generalization G illustrates the placebo-effect and
we referred to G when we explained Anne’s reduced
pain. But how do we explain G itself? Why do sugar
pills and other placebos contribute to reduce pain? In
order to answer this question, we must find the neuro-
psychological mechanisms underlying G. A complete
mechanism-based explanation of G would include,
among other things, a description of the brain states cor-
related with the relevant beliefs and expectations about
painkillers, and then show how these brain states gener-
ate the release of endogenous opiates that cause reports
of reduced pain. An explanatory causal generalization
such as G can, therefore, be explained by showing
how it is generated by underlying mechanisms.
Sciences such as biology, psychology, and the social
sciences explain phenomena by describing the under-
lying mechanisms that generate them. However, this
answer is not satisfying unless we understand what is
meant by “mechanism.” Without entering into contro-
versies on the different specific characterizations of
mechanisms provided by the various philosophical the-
ories, we can adopt a minimal rough notion of
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mechanism as offered by Glennan and Illari (2018, p. 92):
“Amechanism consists of entities, which comprise activi-
ties and interactions that are responsible for the
phenomenon we want to explain.” A mechanism-
based explanation of a phenomenon is a description
or model of the mechanism. Thus, a mechanism-based
explanation shows how parts and their interactions
give rise to the phenomenon we want to explain. More
precisely, the mechanism approach involves decompos-
ing a system into its functionally salient components and
then constructing a model that describes the inter-
actions among the components that generate the
phenomenon in question.
The mechanism approach is a philosophical theory
about scientific explanation that was originally meant
to provide a description of the structure of biological,
psychological, and social scientific explanations
(Machamer et al., 2000; Hedström & Swedberg, 1998).
The idea of mechanism-based explanations goes back
at least to the seventeenth century, and this way of
explaining phenomena has undoubtedly been a tre-
mendous success in the sciences. René Descartes
(1596–1650) was among the first to introduce mechan-
istic explanations for much of human behavior, except
behavior that was controlled directly by the mind (res
cogitans), which according to his dualistic view was a
separate entity from the brain, but interacted with it
in the pineal gland. Hardly any contemporary philoso-
pher or scientist accepts Cartesian dualism; neuro-
science and cognitive science are built on the
assumption that even higher mental functions such
as memory, thinking, and problem solving can be
scientifically explained in the same way as other bio-
psychological phenomena. This assumption is a
necessary condition for providing mechanism-based
explanations of psychological phenomena. However,
this assumption does not entail reductive physicalism,
that is, the view that even mental states such as
desires, experiences, and feelings can be completely
physically explained and described. There are many
non-reductive theories about the mind–body
problem that reject both substance dualism and reduc-
tive physicalism; neuropsychoanalysis and the mechan-
ism approach to explanation are consistent with at
least most of them. Dual-aspect monism is one such
non-reductive theory, proposing that there is just
one kind of stuff that can be perceived either as some-
thing physical or as something mental (Solms & Turn-
bull, 2002, pp. 56–58).
The concept of level is widely used in the sciences,
especially in relation to mechanism-based explanations.
The concept of level can be defined in different ways,
but in this context, it is sufficient to distinguish
between ontological and epistemological levels (also
named “levels of description” or “levels of analysis”)
(see, for example, Wimsatt (2007) for more details
about the concept of level). See Table 1.
Ontological levels refer to different kinds of constitu-
ents of the world.2 An object “located” at level n is con-
stituted by objects at level n-1, and each of these objects
comprises objects at level n-2, all the way down to the
most fundamental physical level (elementary particles),
that is, level 1. Constitution is a part-whole relation
because an object at level n consists of objects (its
parts) at level n-1. For example, a watch consists of a
spring and several interconnected gears, and each of
these components consists of molecules, and each mol-
ecule is a structure of atoms. The upshot is that objects
at higher levels are nothing but the interactions
between constituent parts on lower levels.
For each ontological level, there is an epistemological
level consisting of theories, generalizations, expla-
nations, concepts, and descriptions that refers to the
objects at the corresponding ontological level.3 In
addition, different methods and instruments are
related to each of the epistemological levels. It has
turned out to be considerably harder to define the
relations between the epistemological levels than
between the ontological levels. However, mechanism-
based explanations are able to characterize the relations
among the different epistemological levels based on the
part-whole relations at the corresponding ontological
levels. The structure of mechanism-based explanations
is presented in Figure 1.
As depicted in Figure 1 and Table 1, the phenomenon
to be explained and its composing mechanisms are not
two different phenomena. For example, a table is com-
posed of its micro-physical structure, that is, the table
and its micro-physical structure are not two different
things. On the other hand, cause and effect are distinct
events, objects, states, or processes with a possible
time difference between them, but this does not make
sense for composition. Thus, we must distinguish
between causality and composition. The relation
between ontological levels is composition (see Table 1),
but according to the definition of mechanism (that is,
activities and causal interactions among entities that
are responsible for the phenomenon we want to
explain), there are causal interactions within a mechan-
ism (see Figure 1).4
The personal level
The personal level contains a description of the phenom-
enon we want to explain, called explanandum; the expla-
natory mechanism is named explanans. This level
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comprises explananda such as subjectivity, feelings,
symptoms, behavioral patterns, and empirical generaliz-
ations, which are crucial in psychoanalysis. However,
people do not live in a social vacuum, thus social inter-
actions must be included at this level.5 For example,
some studies have suggested that the actions of close
family members (particularly mothers and fathers) may
trigger psychotic outbursts and relapses in persons
with schizophrenia. This empirical generalization
applies to parents who display considerable emotional
involvement in the form of critical comments, negative
attitudes, and over-protective behavior (Bentall, 2004).
In this example, if this generalization denotes a causal
relation, then we are allowed to conclude that emotional
involvement causes and thereby explains psychotic out-
bursts. The concepts contained in this generalization,
and the explanatory generalization itself, belong to the
personal level. If we ask about the causal processes
that link emotional involvement with psychotic out-
bursts, that is, how emotional involvement generates
psychotic outbursts, then we are asking about the
underlying explanatory psycho-biological mechanisms,
which are unknown. However, knowledge of these
mechanisms would provide an explanation of how
emotional involvement generates psychotic outburst.
The causal generalization constitutes a genuine expla-
nation, but we gain a more detailed understanding of
how actions of close family members cause psychotic
outbursts by describing the underlying mechanisms.
Also, the placebo example mentioned previously illus-
trates how an explanatory empirical generalization at
the personal level (if people are given sugar pills but
believe they are taking painkillers, then they will report
reduced pain) can be explained by referring to under-
lying mechanisms.
The personal level is also a level of meaning and
understanding, that is, accurate descriptions of the ana-
lysand’s own subjective perspective encompassing
beliefs, memories, feelings, fantasies, and desires. In
order to describe the analysand’s subjectivity, the
analyst must use his or her clinical expertise and relevant
theoretical knowledge. The analyst’s descriptions of the
analysand’s subjectivity are based on interpretations of
verbal reports, body-language, crying, periods of
silence, free associations, reports of dreams, and trans-
ference/countertransference.
Hermeneutics provides a general methodological fra-
mework for constructing interpretations; one of the
central principles in hermeneutics is that we can know
the meaning of a phenomenon only if we have a
proper understanding of the context (Wiggins &
Schwartz, 1991).6 For example, an analysand’s idiosyn-
cratic associations may make sense only if you know
her life history. Hermeneutics is well-suited for providing
detailed and nuanced descriptions of the phenomena
we want to explain. For example, based on the analysis
of many kinds of patients we may obtain a detailed
description of paranoid patients’ style of thinking and
feeling in contrast to normal people and other kinds of
patients (Shapiro, 1973).
Interpretation is a dynamic process and interpret-
ations need to be reformulated or even rejected in
view of new information. In this sense, there is an
essential similarity between the hermeneutic method
and the way hypotheses are tested in all empirical
sciences (Føllesdal, 1979). For example, an analyst
may need to reject or change her interpretation
Figure 1. Personal level: A description of the phenomenon to be
explained. Psychological level: The phenomenon is decomposed
into its interacting constituent psychological processes, and this
mechanism explains how the phenomenon is generated. Neu-
roscientific level: Neuroscientific explanations of psychological
processes show how the phenomena are decomposed into,
and thereby generated by, interactions between neuroscientific
processes.
Table 1. The social groups on ontological level 5 consist of
people (level 4). People are composed of cells (level 3), which
in turn are composed of molecules (level 2), which in turn are
composed of atoms and elementary particles (level 1). Each
ontological level has a corresponding epistemological level
consisting of concepts, generalizations, explanations, and
theories about its objects.
Level Ontological Epistemological
5 Social groups Social sciences
4 People Psychoanalysis, psychology
3 Cells Biology
2 Molecules Chemistry
1 Elementary particles Physics
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because of new information conveyed by the patient;
likewise, a natural scientist must change or reject a
hypothesis if it is not consistent with new data. A scien-
tific attitude common to all scientists is that we base
our theories on evidence and are willing to change
our interpretations and hypotheses in light of new evi-
dence (McIntyre, 2019).7
As we have seen, hermeneutics and other methods
can be used to give accurate descriptions of the
phenomena (at the personal level) that need to be
explained. The explanations of phenomena, such as
experiences, desires, dreams, parapraxes, psychopatho-
logical symptoms, and behavioral dispositions and pat-
terns are usually found at lower epistemological levels,
that is, the psychological and neuroscientific levels.
The psychological level
According to the mechanism approach, the processes
referred to at the psychological level should explain
the phenomena at the higher personal level.8 Freud
(1915) postulated the existence of unconscious mental
states and mechanisms in order to explain different
kinds of phenomena at the personal level: obsessions,
ideas and intellectual conclusions that suddenly come
into our head, the nature of post-hypnotic behavior,
etc. For Freud, unconscious states and processes at the
psychological level are inferences to the best expla-
nation of phenomena at the personal level.
Psychological explanations refer to psychological
mechanisms without specifying how these mechanisms
are realized in the brain. Remembering, forgetting, and
problem solving are phenomena at the personal level,
but can probably be explained by mechanisms at the
psychological level. Let us use memory research as an
illustration. According to Hunt and Ellis (2003), sensory
visual stimulations can be stored for a couple of
hundred milliseconds in the sensory register, after
which the information is transferred to the short-term
memory. When the information in the short-term
memory is rehearsed, it may be transferred to and
stored in long-term semantic memory, that is, memory
of conceptual facts about the world. Information in
semantic memory may be retrieved by the short-term
memory, where it is processed and further utilized for
various types of problem solving. The relationships and
concepts referred to in this explanatory model are
purely psychological – they describe information trans-
fers in abstract terms and do not refer to explicit pro-
cesses in the brain. The example serves only as an
illustration of a typical psychological explanation. It is
not claimed that this is the best contemporary model
of how we remember conceptual facts.
The decomposition of memory into its constituent
psychological functions illustrates a common strategy
in psychology and psychoanalysis. We decompose
explanandum into its constituent psychological func-
tions, and the interactions among these functions con-
stitute the explanatory mechanism (explanans). Thus,
decomposition and explanation are two sides of the
same coin (see Figure 1). This decomposition strategy
constitutes the essence of the mechanism approach
(Cummins, 2000).
Freud’s metapsychological speculations belong to
the psychological level, because they refer to sub-per-
sonal unconscious mechanisms (unconscious motives,
transfer of psychic energy, antagonistic forces etc.) that
explain different kinds of behavior and experiences at
the personal level. Almost all psychoanalytic expla-
nations refer to unconscious mental states and pro-
cesses and show how the explananda at the personal
level are generated by mental mechanisms at the
psychological level. If we define cognitive broadly, that
is, to include motives and emotions, then Freud was
essentially a cognitive psychologist, because the
burden of explanation in Freudian theory was laid
upon unconscious mental mechanisms (Erdelyi, 1985;
McKay & Anderson, 2007).
Freud’s (1911) explanation of paranoia is a good illus-
tration of a psychoanalytic mechanism-based expla-
nation at the psychological level. (I use this example as
an illustration only. The question whether the hypoth-
esis is warranted or not is not of importance in this
context.) Freud conjectured that persecutory anxiety
and paranoid delusions are the result of a defense
against repressed homosexual wishes. The underlying
mechanism is a transformation of homosexual love
into hate (reaction-formation), this state being sub-
sequently evacuated via projection on to an external
persecutor. Thus, the paranoia is constituted by the
operation of two defense-mechanisms (reaction-for-
mation and projection) instigated by unconscious
homosexual love. In less abstract terms, Freud (1911,
p. 63) says that the starting point is the desire expressed
by the proposition “I (a man) love him (a man).” Since
this proposition is unacceptable to the individual’s con-
sciousness, it is transformed into its opposite (reaction-
formation): “I do not love him – I hate him!” However,
this feeling of hate is likewise unacceptable to the indi-
vidual’s consciousness and is therefore projected onto
someone in the external world – “He hates me!” There
is no prima facie obvious explanatory connection
between an unconscious homosexual impulse and the
subsequent paranoia; but if we accept the validity of
the two defense mechanisms, reaction-formation and
projection, we can see how the unconscious impulse
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together with the two defense mechanisms constitute a
possible underlying mechanism of paranoia. These
mechanisms are purely psychological, but it has been
suggested that an abnormal salience network function-
ing could be a brain mechanism underlying paranoia
(Menon, 2011). However, if this is the case, it is not
obvious that this neuroscientific explanation would be
consistent with the Freudian psychological mechanism.
Discoveries at the neuroscientific level may either
confirm or falsify postulated psychological mechanisms
and, conversely, confirmed hypotheses about psycho-
logical mechanisms may be of great help when we are
looking for underlying neural mechanisms. Thus, the
research process is a dynamic and mutual co-evolution
of levels.
In a psychoanalytic context, meaning and under-
standing encompass the individual’s subjective perspec-
tive in terms of affects, beliefs, desires, and fantasies. For
the analysand, many of these mental states – for
example, obsessional thoughts and feelings of anxiety
– may appear as both enigmatic and painful. At least
one revolutionary aspect of psychoanalysis is that it
extended the limits of meaningful psychic phenomena
by showing that behavior and experiences that were
previously thought to be determined by, let’s say,
exhaustion or ‘a trick of the brain,’ were in fact meaning-
ful due to being caused by unconscious motives, desires,
beliefs, and fantasies. These unconscious states and their
interactions belong to the psychological level, which
means that meaningful phenomena are not confined
only to the personal level. So far, psychoanalysis has
mostly been concerned about giving an accurate
account of mechanisms at the psychological level; but
one of neuropsychoanalysis’ aims is to link these psycho-
logical mechanisms to mechanisms at the neuroscien-
tific level.
The neuroscientific level
The processes described at the neuroscientific level
explain the psychological phenomena at the psychologi-
cal level, which in turn explain the phenomenon at the
personal level. The example about memory showed
that memory can be decomposed into its constituent
psychological functions (short-term memory, etc.); but
we gain a more satisfactory explanation if we are able
to discover at least some of the brain mechanisms at
the neuroscientific level that generate these functions.
Knowledge about these mechanisms may even help us
to suggest new hypotheses and bring about a reformu-
lation of the original model (Bechtel, 2008; Cummins,
2000). Every updated textbook in cognitive neuro-
science shows that we have learned a lot about the
neural mechanisms underlying memory, and this knowl-
edge has definitely influenced the psychological models
of memory processes.
It is important to keep in mind that Figure 1 gives only
a coarse-grained account of mechanism-based expla-
nations, because many intermediate levels are not
shown in the figure. For example, the brain can be
described and investigated at many different epistemo-
logical levels: biochemical level, neuronal level, connec-
tions between individual neurons, or as an assembly of
interacting brain modules.
The function of the neuroscientific level can be illus-
trated with some psychoanalytically relevant examples.
For example, there is evidence that memories about
traumatic and stressful events related to extreme fear
cannot be encoded, because the hippocampus, which
is necessary for their formation, is partially or completely
shut down by high levels of adrenal steroids that result
from intense stress. The memories are not repressed,
but simply not formed or encoded in the first place
(Yovell et al., 2015, pp. 1534–5). Since the aim of neurop-
sychoanalysis is to bridge neuroscience and psychoana-
lysis, we may ask what is the relation between Freudian
repression and the neuroscientific account? It looks as if
the Freudian account may have been falsified, because it
is very different from the neuroscientific hypothesis and
seems to have less empirical support. On the other hand,
we may conclude that the Freudian notion of repression
just needs to be reformulated, because both accounts
are similar in referring to traumatic experiences that
are likely to be forgotten but can still influence behav-
ior.9 This example illustrates a general problem in
theory development, because when hypothesis Y
replaces hypothesis X, there are two possibilities. We
can say either that X is rejected and has been replaced
by Y, or that Y constitutes an improvement of X. The
repression example may be one of many cases where
it is impossible to decide between these two possibili-
ties, because there is no fact of the matter what the
correct conclusion is. However, as long there is agree-
ment that our theories and models are becoming
increasingly more accurate, it may not matter much
how we choose to describe this increase in knowledge.
References to the distinction between implicit and
explicit memory has become ubiquitous within psycho-
analysis, not only in neuropsychoanalysis. Explicit and
implicit memory can be decomposed into different sub-
systems and neuroscience has made a lot of progress in
describing the brain mechanisms that underlie the sub-
systems (Gazzaniga et al., 2009).
Most people identify memory with explicit memory,
where the individual is consciously aware of the knowl-
edge held and can recall it or recognize it among several
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alternatives. There are two kinds of explicit memory: epi-
sodic and semantic. Episodic memory is the memory of
specific personal experiences (e.g. yesterday, I went to
the cinema and saw Star Wars). Semantic memory is
memory of facts, such as world and language knowledge
(e.g. Paris is the capital of France, and ‘Schnee’ is the
German word for snow).
Implicit memory refers to the measurable effects on
behavior caused by past experiences that the person
does not consciously recall. Implicit memory comprises
different memory systems, such as procedural memory
and classical (Pavlovian) conditioning. Procedural
memory is involved in acquiring sequences of actions
produced by experiences we don’t explicitly remember
(see, for example, Gazzaniga et al., 2009, Ch. 8). The
actions include such things as the ability to play piano,
habitual maladaptive ways of relating to others, and
transference/countertransference. These phenomena
can probably be understood in terms of implicit
memory (Fonagy, 1999; Sletvold, 2003).
Implicit memory reaches maturity earlier than explicit
memory, which means that most of a person’s earliest
memories (before age 3) are implicit. Amnesia of early
childhood is therefore not due to repression, but
because the explicit memory systems in the brain have
not yet developed sufficiently (Weinberger & Stoycheva,
2020). Since implicit memory is somewhat independent
from explicit memory, a child can learn maladaptive
behavior patterns without any explicit memory of the
experiences that gave rise to the behavioral patterns.
Neuroscientific research may also contribute to clarify
some core psychoanalytic concepts. For example, Solms
and Zellner (2012) pointed out the great controversy in
psychoanalysis about whether there is such a thing as an
objectless drive, as Freud claimed. However, evidence
reviewed by Panksepp and Biven (2012) indicated that
the SEEKING system is initially objectless. Initially, there
is a feeling of motivation, desire, or expectancy, but the
affect’s specific ‘aboutness,’ its object or what it is
about, is acquired afterwards through learning and per-
ception. It is not entirely clear whether and how the con-
structs of drives and affects are related, but the example
indicates at least that conceptual controversies in psy-
choanalysis may be informed by neuroscientific
research.
Figure 1 refers to that which in medicine is called
“pathology.” If, on the other hand, you are looking for
the “original” or distal causes of a phenomenon, that
is, how it originally arose, this would be a question of
the phenomenon’s etiology. In the language of psycho-
analytic theorizing, this distinction resembles that
between the genetic and the dynamic aspects of psy-
choanalytic phenomena. The focus here has been on
dynamics, but genetic and dynamic aspects are
different sides of the same coin: the genetic causes
can be seen as setting the dynamic causes in a historical
context. For example, the pathology of a phobic
symptom could be an internal constellation of conflict-
ing motives, but the etiology could be a childhood
trauma.
Genetic or etiological explanations are, of course,
essential in developmental psychology and in theories
about biological and cultural evolution. In Freud’s
account of human development, the past plays a vital
role (“Child is father of the man”); he also offered evol-
utionary explanations of the origin of religion, culture,
the incest taboo, etc. Psychoanalytic case studies
usually offer a mix of mechanism-based and etiological
explanations and the mechanism approach may throw
some light on etiological explanations. For example,
when we look back upon history from a bird’s-eye
view, that is, without zooming in at the details, the
changes may seem quite abrupt or even incomprehensi-
ble. First there was event A, and some time afterwards,
the very different event B occurred. However, in a histori-
cal or etiological explanation we want to know how A
caused B. We seem to gain a better and more satisfac-
tory explanation if we can provide the causal links
between A and B. We explain how A generates B by pro-
viding the intermediate links, X1, X2,… ,Xn. The result is
this causal chain: A→X1→X2… ..Xn→B. In this case
‘X1→… ,→Xn’ represents the generative causal explana-
tory mechanism that explains how A causes B. These
intermediate links or mechanisms can be at lower
levels relative to A and B. For example, different neuro-
psychological mechanisms may explain how childhood
trauma can cause dissociation and other symptoms
later in life.10
I have provided a characterization of mechanism-
based explanations and shown how they relate to neu-
ropsychoanalysis. In the remainder of the paper, I will
first discuss the criticism levelled against neuropsychoa-
nalysis: that it is reductionistic and ignores meaning.
Finally, I will sketch three challenges that neuropsychoa-
nalysis needs to meet.
The threat of reductionism
Assume that neuroscience has been able to explain
some psychoanalytical phenomena. We may then ask,
“Why do we need to refer to phenomena at the psycho-
logical and personal levels at all? Why not refer exclu-
sively to neuroscience and describe the phenomenon
in purely neuroscientific terms?” If we follow this argu-
ment to its fundamental physical level, then it seems
that physics could explain and describe every
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phenomenon. This would be an instance of reduction-
ism, which, in the philosophy of science, means that
one theory (e.g. neuroscience) can be shown to do all
the work of another theory (e.g. psychoanalysis). The
goal of reduction is to replace higher-level explanations
by those at the lower levels. However, I would argue that
the mechanism approach does not entail this kind of
radical reductionism, because it does not follow from
the mechanism approach that there is one privileged
epistemological level. Higher epistemological levels
(e.g. the psychological level) are more abstract and
deal with concepts that ignore many of the details at
the lower levels (e.g. the neuroscientific level). We
need higher epistemological levels because a great
deal of the information at lower levels will be irrelevant
for the phenomena we are trying to describe and
explain. Introducing concepts at higher levels allows us
to describe causal patterns that we would not be able
to describe by using concepts belonging exclusively to
lower epistemological levels, because we would not
‘see the forest for the trees.’ For example, when we
explain why a peg passed through a hole in the wall, it
is sufficient to refer to the geometrical properties of
the peg and the hole. It is not necessary to give a
detailed description of the wall’s atoms and their inter-
actions, because the peg would have passed through
the hole no matter what kinds of atoms were involved.
The geometrical shapes and the rigidity of the peg and
the wall are the only explanatory relevant properties,
and we may miss the importance of these properties if
we instead provide a complicated microphysical expla-
nation (Putnam, 1975). The example indicates a case
where an explanation referring to only higher-level con-
cepts is the better one. Thus, searching for detailed
mechanisms is not always necessary in order to
explain; however, in many cases, we gain a more satis-
factory explanation if we are able to do so, as shown
in the examples referred to earlier.
It is a fundamental hermeneutic principle (“the her-
meneutic circle”) that we understand a part only if we
know the whole context, but the understanding of the
whole context amounts to our understanding of the
individual parts. We find something akin to the herme-
neutic circle in the mechanism approach, as well.
According to Machamer et al., “Higher level entities
and activities are essential to the intelligibility of those
at lower levels, just as much as those at lower levels
are essential for understanding those at higher levels.
It is the integration of different levels into productive
relations that renders the phenomenon intelligible and
thereby explains it” (2000, p. 23). In addition, there is a
reciprocal dynamic relation between the epistemological
levels, because we may need to reformulate an
explanandum after we have found its underlying mech-
anisms. As mentioned earlier, neuropsychological
studies proposed that memory is not a unified phenom-
enon but consists of different memory systems. On the
other hand, the discovery of new explananda may
entail both a reformulation of already known mechan-
isms and postulation of additional ones.
Psychoanalytic purists who think that psychoanalytic
explanations should be completely autonomous, and
that psychoanalysis should not intermingle with psy-
chology and neuroscience, risk turning psychoanalysis
into a museum object. An unwillingness to look for
explanatory mechanisms outside psychoanalysis may
lead to stagnation, as the history of chemistry illustrates.
According to Walsh (1997), chemistry in the nineteenth
century wa an immature discipline that tried to distance
itself from physics, afraid that the physicists’ new con-
ception of “atom” would lead to an overthrow of chem-
istry by physics. The chemists wanted to secure their
autonomy by denying that chemical reactions could
be explained by reference to interacting atoms. Today,
much of chemistry is based on physics and no chemist
would formulate hypotheses violating the laws of
physics. A solid knowledge of physics is a part of every
chemist’s education. What is interesting is that even
though phenomena studied in chemistry can be
explained physically by reference to interacting atoms,
chemistry is not reduced to physics. Most universities
still have departments of both physics and chemistry.
In fact, hardly any examples can be found in the
history of science where one epistemological level has
been totally replaced by another level. Thus, it is not
likely that psychoanalytic institutes and departments of
psychology would be replaced by departments of
neuroscience.
We have seen that radical reductionism is false,
because we need concepts at higher epistemological
levels in order to describe patterns that cannot other-
wise be described. On the other hand, the epistemologi-
cal levels are not completely autonomous or isolated
from each other. The mechanism approach constitutes
a middle ground between these two extremes,
because it entails integration without reductionism or
isolationism.11 The integration derives from the fact
that lower levels have explanatory relevance for higher
levels.
Since neuropsychoanalysis is not a reductionistic
project, we need not fear that it will replace meaning
and understanding with “soulless” neuroscience. This
conclusion was contradicted by Blass and Carmeli
(2007, p. 36), who contended that “Neuropsychoanalysis
ascribes to biology a kind of significance that does away
with the value of meaning and psychic truth which is at
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the foundation of psychoanalysis.” This claim must be
firmly rejected because meaning and psychic truth are
found at the personal and psychological levels, and
the mechanism approach (and thereby neuropsychoa-
nalysis) does not entail the elimination of these epis-
temological levels. Besides, if neuroscience can
contribute to explain some meaningful phenomena, it
does not follow that we have ‘done away’ with the
phenomena. On the contrary, an explanation of a
phenomenon presupposes the existence of the phenom-
enon, because it does not make sense to explain non-
existent phenomena. Of course, there may be many psy-
choanalytic phenomena where neuroscience cannot
make any significant contributions, but this is essentially
an empirical question that cannot be settled a priori.12
Three challenges for neuropsychoanalysis
For the remainder of the paper I would like to show how
the tripartite mechanism-based explanatory model can
serve as a framework for addressing three challenges
to neuropsychoanalysis and psychoanalysis in general.
My modest aim is just to show how these three chal-
lenges to neuropsychoanalysis relate to the mechanism
approach to scientific explanation. It is far beyond the
scope of this paper to go into further details.
Neuropsychoanalysis’ clinical irrelevance
Neuropsychoanalysis has been accused of being clini-
cally irrelevant because it has not made a single contri-
bution that clinicians admit have made a difference to
their work (Talvitie & Ihanus, 2011). According to Blass
and Carmeli (2015, p. 1561), “The analyst concerned
with a meaningful process of understanding the analy-
sands’ inner psychical dynamics has no need to be con-
cerned with the biological matter of the brain…”
It may be right that neuropsychoanalysis is predomi-
nantly a theoretical and explanatory enterprise, but if
neuropsychoanalysis can contribute to construct more
accurate theories and explanations of psychoanalytic
phenomena, it is hard to see how it can avoid being clini-
cally relevant. It would be remarkable if a better under-
standing of how the mind works had no clinical
consequences. For example, theories and explanations
in physiology are obviously relevant for medical
therapy, and well-established empirically confirmed the-
ories in physics and chemistry have undoubtedly helped
engineers to construct new and better technology. On
the other hand, one can agree with Blass and Carmeli
(2015) that the analyst qua therapist has no need to be
concerned with neuroscience, simply because thera-
pists, whether they are psychoanalysts or general
practitioners, should not necessarily think about abstract
theoretical issues when practicing therapy, but rather
should focus on communicating with the patient. For
the general practitioner, it may be sufficient to know
that a therapy for a certain disease actually works. In
other words, it is not necessary to remember all the
detailed explanations of the symptoms and the full
theory about the disease in order to give correct diagno-
sis and therapy. There usually is a division of labor
between the general practitioners and the scientists
who do research on diseases, but therapy should be
based on both research and empirically confirmed the-
ories. Likewise, research and theory development in neu-
ropsychoanalysis, when therapeutically relevant, should
influence therapy. The relation between theory and
practice is a general problem that takes us far beyond
the scope of this paper, but according to Manson
(2003), theoretical psychoanalytic knowledge of
different mechanisms provides broad causal templates
for identifying relevant psychological factors lying
behind phenomena observed in the consulting room.
The hermeneutic method mentioned previously is of
utmost importance for the analysts’ ability to formulate
ideographic explanations and interpretations. However,
these explanations and interpretations are based on
theoretical assumptions about explanations, for
example of the observed phenomena.
To what extent the mechanism-based explanations
provided by neuropsychoanalysis will be therapeutically
relevant is an open question. However, one can agree
with the critics that the burden of proof is on the neu-
ropsychoanalysts to show that neuropsychoanalysis
can contribute to improved therapy.
Neuropsychoanalysis and psychology
Psychoanalytic hypotheses not only should be consist-
ent with neuroscience, but also should cohere with
other scientific disciplines, such as anthropology, evol-
utionary biology, and psychology. Freud’s most interest-
ing and revolutionary ideas are related to the
psychological level and he gave up the attempt to
base psychological hypotheses on neuroscience, even
though the ultimate goal was to give psychoanalysis a
neuroscientific foundation. However, this was left for
future work.
Neuroscience has made tremendous progress since
Freud’s time; but, by focusing exclusively on the relation
between psychoanalysis and neuroscience, neuropsy-
choanalysis risks ignoring the psychological level, that
is, psychological evidence and alternative psychological
explanations. The explanations that compete with the
psychoanalytic explanations are mainly other
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psychological explanations and not neuroscientific ones.
Psychoanalysis and psychology are framing hypotheses
at the same psychological level, prompting Erdelyi
(1985) to describe psychoanalysis as ‘Freud’s cognitive
psychology.’ Thus, in order to confirm psychoanalytic
hypotheses, it is not sufficient to show that they are con-
sistent with neuroscience; they also must be corrobo-
rated at least as much as the competing psychological
hypotheses. The psychological disciplines seem to be
as important as neuroscience when we attempt to con-
struct mechanism-based explanations. Neuropsychoa-
nalysis should therefore pay attention to and evaluate
the alternative psychological explanations before
searching for the underlying brain mechanisms of the
postulated psychoanalytic explanations.
The purpose of this short discussion is to observe that
there is a psychological level in addition to the neuros-
cientific level and, therefore, one should not forget to
take into consideration alternative explanations at this
level. For example, we previously have seen that psycho-
logical explanations referring to the distinction between
explicit and implicit memory differed from the psycho-
analytic explanations.
Some opponents of neuropsychoanalysis have
claimed that neuropsychoanalysis is clinically irrelevant,
reductionistic and ignores meaning, but this criticism
has been rejected. Nor should it be an insurmountable
problem to take alternative psychological explanations
into consideration before looking for underlying brain
mechanisms. However, I will now turn to a challenge
for neuropsychoanalysis that is more difficult to meet.
Neuropsychoanalysis and the future of
psychoanalysis
Ramus (2013) levelled a rather harsh criticism against
neuropsychoanalysis by claiming that research on
phenomena that are of interest to psychoanalysts
today takes place outside the psychoanalytic context.
Psychoanalysis may have been heuristic in stimulating
much research, but it is difficult to see what contri-
butions psychoanalysis makes to the current research
on mind and behavior. Psychoanalytic ideas mostly
seem to be ignored in psychology, psychiatry, and
neuroscience. In addition, the results in cognitive
neuroscience only partially support the psychoanalytic
hypotheses, and neuroscientists do not refer to psycho-
analysis or use psychoanalytic concepts in their
research. The observed correspondences between psy-
choanalysis and neuroscience seem to be superficial
and hardly support the psychoanalytic hypotheses
(Paris, 2017). Psychologists and neuroscientists seem
to agree that they already have the necessary
methodological, conceptual and theoretical resources
to give empirically confirmed explanations of every-
thing that psychoanalysis purports to explain. This
harsh and perhaps exaggerated criticism of psychoana-
lysis and neuropsychoanalysis indicates that the great-
est challenge facing psychoanalysis today is to
convince psychologists, psychiatrists and neuroscien-
tists of the scientific relevance and contributions of psy-
choanalytic theories and ideas.
Psychoanalysis is an enterprise with a great past. It
has been a major influence on psychology and psychia-
try and has been rich in suggesting interesting
hypotheses. However, the future of psychoanalysis is
uncertain, and psychoanalysts need to answer the criti-
cisms cited above. It is not my purpose to delve
further into this these challenges, but I think Westen
(2002, p. 371) was on the right track when he pointed
out, “One of the major ways in which psychoanalysis
can contribute to cognitive neuroscience, rather than
just learn from it, is to bring to bear clinical data and con-
ceptualizations that would probably not emerge from
the laboratory.” Psychology and neuroscience are pri-
marily experimental sciences, but the experimental
method, like all methods, has its limits. Human
suffering, sexuality in all its aspects, fantasies, and dys-
functional behavioral patterns are difficult to bring to
the laboratory, but they are genuine phenomena that
psychology and neuroscience need to take into con-
sideration in order to be true branches of science that
study whole human beings and not just a few aspects
of human experience and behavior. For psychoanalysts,
the interesting phenomena or aspects are usually those
related to therapy. Whether the resulting mechanism-
based explanations of these phenomena will be psycho-
analytic in any meaningful sense of that word is an open
question.
Notes
1. Machamer et al. (2000) is the starting point for the con-
temporary debate about mechanism-based expla-
nations. My account of mechanism-based explanations
is partly based on Craver (2007) and Bechtel (2008).
2. Ontology concerns the nature of reality and what kinds
of entities there are. A theory’s ontology are the entities
that the theory claims exist. For example, repressed
memories are a part of the Freudian theory’s ontology.
3. Epistemology is the study of knowledge and is con-
cerned with general questions related to knowledge.
For example, what are the sources of knowledge and
what are the necessary and sufficient conditions of
knowledge?
4. Cf. Craver (2007). The nature of causality is a huge area
to which this paper cannot do justice, but see
Mumford and Anjum (2013) for a short and concise
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introduction to different philosophical theories about
causality.
5. Since the personal level also includes social interactions,
it would perhaps have been more accurate to name it
‘the personal-relational level’, but I choose ‘personal
level’ for simplicity’s sake.
6. Hermeneutics concerns the methodology of interpret-
ation and deals with meaningful human actions and
the products of such actions.
7. Issues regarding the scope and limits of hermeneutics in
psychoanalysis go far beyond the scope of this paper,
but I will return to this topic in the section about the
possible clinical relevance of neuropsychoanalysis.
8. The psychological level could be named the ‘sub-per-
sonal’ or ‘cognitive level.’ However, all non-psychologi-
cal neurophysiological processes are also sub-personal,
and the term cognition seems to exclude emotions
and drives, which are of utmost importance in psycho-
analytic explanations.
9. The existence of Freudian repression is still controversial.
Holmes (1995) argue that repression does not exist and
Erdelyi (2006) equals repression with suppression, which
has been more thoroughly investigated (Cf. Anderson
and Green (2001) and Anderson et al. (2004)).
However, it is far beyond the scope of this paper to
discuss the validity of repression.
10. Perry et al. (1995). Cf. Glennan (2010) for more about the
function of mechanisms in historical/genetic explanations.
11. Because mechanism-based explanations integrate
different levels, they are also named ‘multilevel mechan-
istic explanations.’
12. The conclusions in this section are consistent with the
non-reductive view on the mind-body problem as pre-
viously described.
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